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Reviewed by Robyn Carston, University College London
We are told at the beginning of this book that using language is like
dancing a waltz, playing a piano duet or making love, in that they are all
kinds of joint action. The key word in this book is, without doubt, `joint';
it occurs in at least the following phrases, all of which have an important role
to play in the account: joint activities, joint actions, joint acts, joint events,
joint closure, joint construals, joint projects, joint eﬀort, joint commitments,
joint focus of attention, joint perceptual experience, joint salience, joint
knowledge, joint management, joint purpose, joint pretense, joint solutions.
This central thesis that `language use is a form of joint action' might strike
many linguists as simply wrong. For instance, some might think that
language is used in thinking, which is surely not a joint action, in fact not
usefully thought of as an action of any sort; then there is talking aloud when
alone, which one may do for a variety of reasons: to rehearse a speech, to see
whether something one has written really does express the intended ideas, to
divert oneself from tormenting thoughts, to enjoy the sounds of a poem, for
the sheer delight of belting out the words of `Oh come all ye faithful' while
in the shower, etc. For those who construe `language use' as encompassing
these possibilities, the title of the book is misleading: `language' here does
not entail something that has such linguistic properties as phonology,
morphology and syntax, because it includes non-linguistic gestures such as
pointing, nodding, eye-gaze, and certain types of smiling, frowning and other
facialandbodilymovements,andthe`use'atissueisentirelycommunicative.
Face-to-face conversation is taken to be the basic type (so it is the primary
focus of the book), and all other communicative uses of linguistic entities
(like letter-writing, story-telling, interviewing, organised discussion, etc.) are
taken to be secondary and derivative. What the book is really about is what
Clark calls `signaling' (and others call `ostensive communication'); that does
indeed include many non-linguistic behaviours and exclude many (non-
communicative) employments of linguistic forms.
This volume is the culmination of over a decade of work by Clark and his
colleagues, in which the view of language use as a joint action embedded
within broader social activities has become more and more the central focus.
To establish this, Clark deploys an interesting conjunction of scholars and
disciplines, welding the philosophical views of Lewis and Austin to the
empirical inductive observations of conversation analysts, such as Sacks,
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Schegloﬀ and Jeﬀerson, and to the work of J. B. Bavelas (probably
unfamiliar to most linguists) on ostensive gestures, or what she calls
`nonverbal linguistic acts', a concept that is clearly re¯ected in Clark's
account of `language' use. Ideas from the ®eld of pragmatics, a concept that
for many is instantly activated by talk of `language use', has a very meagre
presence: the work of Sperber & Wilson and other relevance theorists, of
Bach & Harnish, Larry Horn, and Georgia Green is essentially passed over,
and Levinson enters the scene only in his most social and least linguistic
manifestations. Inadequate and misguided approaches to language use are
characterised by Clark as having most or all of the following properties: they
concentrate on the products of language use rather than on what people do
with language, they have grown out of the generative grammar tradition,
they ignore the central role played by non-linguistic elements of signals, they
give insuﬃcient attention and weight to the crucial concept of context, the
speaker's meaning (communicative intention) is given an inappropriate
primacy over, and autonomy from, the hearer's recognition of it and the
collaborative processes of speaker and hearer. Whether or not this
characterisation does pick out an approach to language use (Clark names no
names), the listed de®ciencies provide a useful way of highlighting the
properties of his own account, which are in clear contrast to them.
The view of language and communication adopted in the book is pure
David Lewis; the key concepts are `coordination problem', `convention' and
`common ground'. The goal of language use (¯signaling) is an increase in
the interlocutors' common ground, but to achieve this they have to solve a
participant coordination problem (that is, reach a joint construal of the
signal), and one of the most important devices for achieving the required
coordination is that of convention. As well as conventions of use (e.g.
diﬀerenttypesofgreetingindiﬀerentcultures)andconventionsofperspective
(e.g. the diﬀerence between `®rst ¯oor' as used in Britain and in North
America), the lexical entries and grammatical rules that make up a linguistic
system are conventions. The following gives the ¯avour: `As Lewis argued,
the phonological, lexical, morphological, syntactic, and semantic rules of a
language ± its grammar ± constitute a conventional signaling system. They
describe regularities of behavior ± what English speakers regularly do, and
expect others to do, to achieve part of what they intend to do in using sounds,
words, constructions, and sentences for communication' (77).
In understanding an utterance, these (and other, nonlinguistic) con-
ventional devices interact with nonconventional coordination devices, which
include perceptual salience (of objects in the physical context, for instance),
explicit agreement (on how a term is to be used, for instance), precedence (in
referring to something in a certain way, for instance), the ultimate criterion
fortheirusebeingjointsalience.Thefactorswhichnecessitatethisinteraction
of the conventional and the nonconventional include ambiguity, indexicality,
novel uses of words and structures, and what Clark calls layering, which
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arises in various `nonserious' uses of language, including ®ctions, tropes like
hyperbole and irony, teasing and ostensible communicative acts (e.g. pretend
invitations). In short, it is those factors which are generally considered to
comprise the domain of pragmatic theory. There is, however, no pragmatic
criterion at work in this picture of comprehension; Grice's maxims and other
communicative principles, characterised as reductions of Grice's system,
such as Sperber & Wilson's Principle of Relevance, are dismissed as
misguided. Elements of Grice's Cooperative Principle are taken up and recast
in terms of the joint purpose of conversationalists, and the various joint
actions they engage in in arriving at a joint construal of a given signal.
Among the various coordination devices involved in achieving this, a crucial
role is played by a range of metacommunicative acts, in what can be thought
of as track 2, parallel with the communicative acts in track 1. The function
of these metacommunicative acts, which include acknowledgments like ``uh
huh'', ``yeah'' or a nod, is to establish the mutual belief that signals have
been understood well enough for current purposes (that is, to bring about
joint closure on the joint actions in the communicative track).
Signaling is an act by which one person means something for another.
While signaling encompasses the Gricean concept of speaker meaning as
involving a complex (re¯exive) intention on the part of the speaker, one of
Clark's central contentions is that it should not be viewed in the listener-free
sort of way that Grice, Searle and others adopt. Rather, it is to be seen as
typically a joint act located, together with other joint acts, within a broader
joint activity such as two people hanging curtains together, planning a
holiday with a friend, a buying-selling transaction, a car-driving}road-
navigating interaction, or such intrinsically communicative activities as
discussing the latest news, having a gossip or making conversation at a party.
Signals (including linguistic ones) are devices for coordinating actions at
various stages of these activities; they provide a shared basis for adding to
common ground some information which will further the current goals of the
participants. On thisconstrual, signalinginvolves both the speaker's meaning
intention and the `discharge' (or ful®lment) of that intention through the
hearer's recognition of it. In fact, any signaling act involves a ladder of four
levels of (cotemporal) joint action, which are in an upwards causal relation:
(a) the joint action of the articulatory}gesticulatory behaviour of the signaler
paired with its perception by the addressee; (b) the joint action of
presentation of a particular signal (e.g. a linguistic expression and}or a
bodily gesture) and its identi®cation by the addressee; (c) the signaling that
p and the addressee's recognition that p is what is meant (an action which
must ultimately issue in a joint construal of the signal's meaning); (d) the
proposal of a joint project and the addressee's consideration of the proposal
(followed, in most instances, by uptake). Minimal joint projects (manifest in
Schegloﬃan `adjacency pairs') include the following: greeting reciprocation,
the transfer of information (manifest in an answer to a question), instigating
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a behaviour (manifest in, for instance, an addressee sitting down when
requested}advised}ordered}invited to do so), settling on a view (manifest in
an addressee assenting to a speaker's assertion). This fourth level, which goes
beyond the concerns of most pragmatic theories (which focus on level 3), is
crucial on Clark's view, because it provides the rationale for signaling, which
is to further the joint activities people are engaged in at the time and to
advance the common ground of the social group, thereby increasing the
possibilities for subsequent joint activities.
Most signals are the result of a fusion of three methods of signaling:
`describing-as', `indicating' and `demonstrating', which respectively employ
the symbolic (linguistic expressions being the paradigm case), the indexical
(e.g. pointing) and the iconic (e.g. manual, facial and}or vocal gestures,
including intonation). Here's a simple example: `George sees Helen and says
``Hello.'' He uses his voice and eye gaze to indicate himself as speaker, Helen
as addressee, and now as the time of greeting. He uses his smile, open eyes,
and magni®ed intonation to demonstrate his enthusiasm. Helen, in turn, not
only interprets each of these methods, but integrates them to understand him
as meaning, roughly, ``I, George, now greet you, Helen, enthusiastically''.
The point is this: ``Hello'' is treated not as three parallel signals with
separate interpretations, but as a single signal with a uni®ed interpretation'
(185).
It is through this discussion of the composite nature of signals that Clark
is led to his revision of the concept of `language' as languageu (that is,
language in use), to be distinguished from languages (that is, language
structure), languages providing but one of the entwined strands of a signal.
Languageu encompasses all manifestations of communicative (and meta-
communicative) intent, including, for instance, the displacement of tokens on
a board by the players in a game of chess. Two questions arise for me, the
®rst one rhetorical: (1) Why use the word `language' here at all, when it is
signaling which is the subject? (2) Is it clear that to study the use of languages
is as deeply mistaken an endeavour as Clark would have it? To do so would,
of course, be to abstract away from the full complexity of communicative
performances at a diﬀerent point from Clark, carving out a narrower
domain, but one which might enable a deeper dig, looking at (some of) the
mechanisms that underlie and enable signaling behaviour. Interestingly, he
himself points out that his three signaling methods, of which the linguistic is
one, involve diﬀerent cognitive resources: a mental lexicon and grammatical
rules for describing-as, a mental representation of current spatio-temporal
surroundings for indicating, and memory for appearances for demonstrating
(184). This is, however, the only explicit mention of cognitive capacities and
systems in the book.
The reservations I've indicated notwithstanding, the meticulous and
inexorable way in which Clark builds his account, brick by brick, is very
impressive and the ®nal, tightly interlocking structure coheres in a satisfying
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way. Each of his many `principles' is supported by a wealth of detailed
discussion and illustrative examples; the examples are authentic, taken from,
among others, the London-Lund corpus, and annotated to indicate such
features of speech as tone unit, pauses and overlapping utterance. He uses
apt literary quotes and amusing anecdotes to engage the reader. Several of
the chapters in which he presents existing views are interesting and useful
independent of their role in furthering his project. For instance, the chapter
on that tricky notion of `common ground', a notion that seems inevitably to
arise in some form or other in any serious model of human communication,
sets out three diﬀerent conceptions of common ground: Lewis's original
`shared basis' view (which he adopts), the re¯exive de®nition and the iterated
propositions representation that emerges from it. Clark's discussion of the
psychological plausibility (possibility even) of these conceptions is judicious.
Similarly, his summaries of Austin (whom he considers a forebear of his
`language as social (hence joint) action' view), of Grice and of Searle (of
whom he is more critical ± for what he sees as their autonomous speaker
orientation) and of Peirce on symbols, indices and icons, are excellent, clear
and succinct introductions to these people's ideas.
In reading this book I participated in a joint action with Herb Clark in
which I struggled to coordinate with him; our initial common ground was
somewhat sparse, apparently not even containing a meaning for the word
language; I am not sure that we have reached a joint construal, though we
have expended a deal of joint eﬀort. I am sure, however, that I gained a good
range of cognitive eﬀects, and that all other readers will too.
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